Abstract. At CRYPTO '94, Tillich and Zémor proposed a family of hash functions, based on computing a suitable matrix product in groups of the form SL 2 (F 2 n ). We show how to construct collisions between palindromic bit strings of length 2n + 2 for Tillich and Zémor's construction. The approach also yields collisions for related proposals by Petit et al. from ICECS '08 and CT-RSA '09.
Introduction
In their paper Hashing with SL 2 , Tillich and Zémor [12] propose a construction for obtaining a cryptographic hash function. The proposal builds on earlier work [11, 13, 14] and received significant cryptanalytic interest. Various cryptanalytic results were reported [1, 3, 5, 8, 10] , and in recent years, interest in Tillich and Zémor's construction has increased again. More specifically, in [9] Petit, Veyrat-Charvillon, and Quisquater suggest a construction, building on parameter choices in [12] which are considered to be secure against known attack techniques. This approach has been explored further in [8] and [4] , and to the best of our knowledge no collisions have been reported for the proposed parameter choices. In [4] , de Meulenaer et al. conclude that a modification of the Tillich-Zémor construction has significant advantages over dedicated and block cipher-based hash functions including scalability, parallelism and a collision resistance reducing to the hardness of a mathematical problem.
Our Contribution We establish a connection between the Tillich-Zémor proposal and maximal length chains in the Euclidean algorithm for polynomials over the field of two elements. After developing some results on collisions between palindromic bit strings, we combine these facts with a result of Mesirov and Sweet [6] . This reduces the identification of collisions for the Tillich-Zémor hash function to a linear algebra problem which can be easily solved with a computer algebra system. Our attack also yields collisions for the recent proposals of Petit et al., and we demonstrate the practicability of our approach by giving collisions for all specific parameter choices considered in [4, 9] . Standard Merkle-Damgård strengthening does not prevent the attack, as the obtained colliding messages are of equal length.
Preliminaries

Notation
Throughout, we denote by V the collection of all bit strings, i.e., V := {0, 1} * . Further, if v ∈ V , we denote by |v| the length of the bit string v. In our attack, we will make use of palindromes, i.e., bit
Let F 2 n be a finite field represented as
) with an irreducible polynomial q(x) of degree n. We denote by α a root of q(x), and it will be convenient to denote by G the group SL 2 (F 2 n ), i.e., the group of 2 × 2 matrices of determinant 1 over
a i means the 2 × 2 identity matrix over F 2 when r = 0, and ( r−1 i=1 a i ) · a r when r > 0. Eventually, we need the specific matrices
With the above notation, according to the Tillich-Zémor proposal in [12] , hashing a bit string v = b 1 . . . b m ∈ V translates into applying the functionh : V → G defined by:
The goal of our attack is to find a collision forh, i.e., a pair [8, 9] . By construction, any collision for the original Tillich-Zémor construction also yields a collision for these more recent proposals. Hence, throughout we restrict to constructing collisions for the original proposal from CRYPTO '94.
Challenge Parameters
Originally, Tillich and Zémor suggest a value of n ∈ {130, . . . , 170} for their construction, and in view of [10] imposing n to be prime now seems to be common. The most up-to-date suggestions we are aware of originate from [9] , where the following choices of the irreducible polynomial q(x) are proposed to define the underlying
x 127 + x + 1,
x 509 + x 8 + x 7 + x 3 + 1,
We do not know if a trapdoor has been embedded in any of these polynomials (cf. [10] ), but according to [4] the above five polynomials are safe with respect to the attacks in [1, 5, 10] . More specifically, for a collision resistance comparable to SHA-1, de Meulenaer et al. in [4] suggest to use the polynomial x 127 + x + 1. For a collision resistance comparable to SHA-256 the use of
The use of a field F 2 n with a prime number n close to 1024 has already been considered in [7] , but as we demonstrate below, also for such a parameter choice, collisions can be identified efficiently.
Finding Short Palindrome Collisions
To identify collisions for the Tillich-Zémor hash function, we proceed in three steps.
Collision Preserving Change of Generators
First, we prove that the search for collisions for the Tillich-Zémor hash function can be transferred to the search for collisions when new, specific generators c 0 and c 1 are used. We set c 0 = s 0 and obtain the matrix c 1 by conjugating s 1 by s 0 , i.e.,
Then, direct computation yields
In particular, c 1 is symmetric and differs from c 0 only in a single entry. Based on these new generators, we define h : V → G by:
The following proposition establishes that finding collisions for the Tillich-Zémor scheme is equivalent to finding collisions for h.
Proposition 1. Let v, v ∈ V . Thenh(v) =h(v ) if and only if h(v) = h(v ).
Proof.
Conjugating by s 0 , we see that the latter equality holds if and only if s Remark 2. For any element t ∈ G, the conjugating map φ t : g → g t = t −1 gt will replace the two generators s 0 , s 1 by s t 0 , s t 1 . Just as in Proposition 1 above, bit string collisions for a hash function based on s 0 , s 1 will be preserved by φ t to produce identical bit string collisions for the corresponding hash function based on s t 0 , s t 1 . The specific choice t = s 0 turns out to be very helpful for our purposes.
Palindromic Collisions
In this section, we work inside the group SL 2 (F 2 [x]) of unimodular matrices over the polynomial ring F 2 [x] rather than over a field F 2 n . Accordingly, we define matrices
, now with polynomial entries, as follows:
and we define H :
) by:
In other words, H is defined as h in Sect. 3.1, except that now
We apply H to a particular subset of elements of V , namely, the set of all palindromes in V , and obtain the following results. 
By the induction hypothesis, b = c, and the first part of the result follows. We easily check that the statement about the degrees is also true.
Next, we examine the function ρ :
We are interested in evaluating ρ modulo a given irreducible polynomial because ρ(v) ≡ 
Proof. Let H (v) = a b c d
, and consider ρ(v). Direct computation yields:
Since v is a palindrome, by Lemma 1 we have that b = c, so that
and the claim follows with the degree statement in Lemma 1.
For our attack we are interested in palindromes of even length, i.e., palindromes that can be written in the form vv r for some v ∈ V . Here the following holds.
Proposition 3. If v ∈ V is a palindrome of even length, then H (v)
Proof. Let v = ww r for some w ∈ V . The proof is by induction on |w|. When |w| = 0 the hash H (ww r ) is the identity matrix and the statement holds trivially.
Suppose now we extend a string w of given length by one bit, yielding a palindrome βvβ = (βw)(w r β) with β ∈ {0, 1}. By the induction hypothesis we have that H (v) = H (ww r ) = a 2 b b d 2 , so that:
Consequently, both diagonal entries of H (βvβ) are squares, and the result follows.
Combining Propositions 2 and 3, we obtain the following corollary. 
is the upper left entry of H (v).
Further, from the proof of Proposition 3 we are able to deduce the following recurrence relation: 
. . b i ) is given by
p i = ⎧ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 1, if i = 0; x + b 1 + 1, if i = 1; (x + b i )p i−1 + p i−2 , if 1 < i ≤ n.
Maximal Length Chains in the Euclidean Algorithm
Now, for the given irreducible polynomial q = q(x) ∈ F 2 [x] of degree n, used to define the field F 2 n , we seek a palindrome v ∈ V of length 2n such that ρ(v) = H (0v0) + H (1v1) is the zero 2 × 2 matrix over F 2 [x]/(q(x)). In view of Corollaries 1 and 2, we can accomplish this task by determining a second polynomial p(x) ∈ F 2 [x] of degree n − 1 such that gcd(q(x), p(x)) = 1 and the following holds: during the execution of the Euclidean algorithm with input (q(x), p(x) ), the successive quotients are all of degree 1, and the degree of each remainder is only one less than the degree of the respective divisor. This will ensure a "Euclidean algorithm chain" of maximal length and adherence to the recurrence relation in Corollary 2. The existence of such a polynomial p(x) follows from the subsequent result by Mesirov and Sweet [6] . [6] ). Given any irreducible polynomial q of degree n over F 2 , there is a sequence of polynomials p n , p n−1 , . . . , p 0 with p n = q and p 0 = 1, and additionally, the degree of p i is equal to i and p i ≡ p i−2 mod p i−1 .
Proposition 4 (Mesirov and Sweet
Note that once we know a polynomial p = p n−1 as mentioned in Proposition 4 which matches our given polynomial p n = q, the Euclidean algorithm will uniquely complete the sequence p n , p n−1 , . . . , p 1 , p 0 = 1. The linear quotients x + β i (i = 1, . . . , n) occurring in Euclid's algorithm allow us to derive the bits b i of the palindrome in Corollary 2. Mesirov and Sweet prove Proposition 4 by considering the field F 2 ((x −1 )) of formal power series in x −1 and continued fraction expansions of elements in this field, and their proof actually contains an algorithm to compute p = p n−1 . More specifically, on input of an irreducible polynomial q = q(x) of degree n, the following algorithm from [6] always produces exactly two solutions for p:
(1) Construct a matrix A ∈ F (n+1)×n 2 from the n + 1 polynomials Before demonstrating our attack with the challenge parameters from Sect. 2.2, we note that a palindrome collision immediately yields a different (non-palindromic) collision with bit strings of the same length. One easily checks the following.
Remark 4. Let v ∈ V be a palindrome. Then h(0v0) = h(1v1) if and only if h(0v1) = h(1v0).
Collisions for the Challenge Parameters
With the attack just presented, it is a matter of seconds to derive collisions for the challenge parameters from Sect. 2.2. We implemented our attack in the computer algebra system Magma [2] on a standard PC. As expected, for each choice of
i.e., we obtain two collisions of bit strings of length 2n + 2. For simplicity, below we restrict to listing one bit string v 1 for each challenge parameter-the value v 2 can be obtained by reversing v 1 followed by inverting the first and last bit. To specify v 1 , we use hexadecimal notation where each hexadecimal digit represents 4 bits (0 − 0000, 1 − 0001, . . . , E − 1110, F − 1111). Spaces are for readability only.
A Collision for SL
Here we may choose v 1 = 8000 0000 0000 0003 0000 0000 0000 000 followed by the three bit sequence 000.
Here we may choose v 1 = 4451 04E5 4DAB 26EB 91D3 5201 0EBD E579 54F7 AE10 0959 713A EC9A B654 E411 44
followed by the three bit sequence 011.
Here we may choose B808 2B84 9A1C 569C 9043 7170 8D98 E3EB C923 4CF8  44F4 552C 8B49 1D45 25C4 9689 A551 7910 F996 249E BE38 CD88  7476 1049 CB51 C2C9 0EA0 80ED 8B3E E84 followed by the single bit 1.
Here we may choose Here we may choose 31E2 BFD6 5D34 A98C 7FEF 8049 6043 1918 8835 7F23 1BEF  CF42 391A E5AF A211 BACE 74DF F1B3 4B0D 372F 1A17 4D0C FE33  6064 292E 790A 57C7 DF43 5E17 E424 49EA 3BE4 C978 3D58 1F53  ECDA DE3A 6B60 06DC 5EDD 8E80 E201 B9C8 23A7 0998 3521 A78D  8D49 1239 8700 9071 2D47 943F A369 C3C9 ABF7 7E05 FC66 FA4E  607C 0D22 433E 8368 42F9 8489 607C 0CE4 BECC 7F40 FDDF AB27  872D 8BF8 53C5 691C 1201 C338 9125 6363 CB09 5833 21CB 8827  3B00 8E02 E376 F476 C00D ACB8 F6B6 6F95 F035 783D 264F B8AF  2448 4FD0 F585 F7C7 D4A1 3CE9 284C 0D98 FE61 65D0 B1E9 D961  A59B 1FF6 5CE6 BB10 8BEB 4EB1 3885 E7EF B189 FD58 2231 3184  0D24 03EF FC63 2A59 74D7 FA8F 191B 7 followed by the three bit sequence 011.
Conclusion
The above discussion shows that neither the Tillich-Zémor hash function from CRYPTO '94 nor its variants from ICECS '08 and CRT-RSA '09 should be used in applications where collision resistance is essential.
